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Abstract
This paper investigates the strategic impact of organizational design
on product market competition. In a duopoly model of horizontal
and vertical product dierentiation, each rm's manager can impose
a product location, or delegate responsibility to select product location
to his subordinate. The task of a subordinate is to develop and pro-
duce the good. Quality is determined by his eort level, which depends
on his private benets. The managers compete on a product market
by selling the goods produced by their subordinates. Conditions for
existence of equilibria are derived, and implications for management
strategy are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Top managers of rms do not only make \strategic" decisions, for instance on
product choice and price setting, but also decide on organizational issues like
delegating responsibility to subordinates. Think, for instance, of a product
manager who is responsible for his rm's market strategy, and has to decide
which product variety to sell in some market segment. A layer below him in
the hierarchy, there is a middle manager, such as the head of the development
and production department. In this paper, I study the strategic impact of
organizational structure, or more specic, of giving the middle manager a
say in the choice of a product variety that his department has to develop and
produce.
Consider, as an example of the model, an oligopolistic market for some
soft drink, say cola, in which consumers have dierent preferences for dif-
ferent varieties (such as regular cola, cherry cola, diet cola, and caeine-free
cola). For each variety, consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality.
Suppose price competition is erce: for given qualities, a rm gains more if
it positions its brand in a market niche (by dierentiating its product), than
if it sells a drink aimed at an \average" taste.1
Each rm consists of a product manager and his subordinate (or middle
manager), who represents the development and production department.2 The
product manager has to choose which cola type to sell, and at which price.
The subordinate performs development and production activities; quality is
determined by his eort level. Whereas a product manager cares about sales
or prots, his subordinate is motivated by private benets. For instance,
because of career concerns he nds the acquisition of professional experience
important, or alternatively, he is challenged by technical innovativeness of
1Casual empirical evidence suggests that product dierentiation is an important source
of prots in soft drink markets. Coca-Cola, for instance, has recently introduced, among
other varieties, ginseng-based and milk-based drinks in Japan, and sugar-free colorless cola
in America (The Economist, \Fizzing," September 4th 1993, 67-71).
2Obviously, there may also be conicts of interest between the middle manager and the
engineers of his department, raising a host of additional interesting issues.
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products. Developing and producing a certain type of cola requires specic
technical knowledge (e.g. about chemicals and production processes), so that
his enthusiasm for dierent types of colas will vary.
A product manager does not know how his subordinate's preferences.
The subordinate, however, has to invest costly time and eort to nd out
his potential personal gains. A manager can either impose which variety has
to be produced (e.g. impose diet cola), or give his subordinate a say in the
choice of variety (e.g. let him choose between diet cola and caeine-free cola,
but not regular and cherry cola). If the subordinate has sucient discretion,
he will want to acquire information about the possible drink types, so that
he can recommend his preferred variety. If he is allowed to develop and
produce his preferred variety, he will exert maximal eort, and high quality
will result.3
In the model, a product manager faces the following tradeo. If he gives
his subordinate more discretion, it becomes more likely that he will get in-
formed in order to make a proposal which, if accepted, will lead to a high
quality drink (a premium brand). The subordinate's proposal, however, may
imply little dierentiation from other cola varieties, and therefore result in
erce price competition. Less discretion enables the manager better to posi-
tion a drink in a market niche, so that local monopoly prots can be enjoyed.
The subordinate's incentives to take initiative and exert eort, however, de-
crease, so that expected quality will be lower.
In the model, the possible cola varieties correspond to locations on an
interval representing consumers' dierent tastes. It is therefore convenient
to make a comparison with the Hotelling model. In the standard Hotelling
3
The Economist discusses empirical support for the claim that rms \[: : : ] which give
middle managers a say in forming strategy perform better" and provides examples of
delegation of responsibility. For instance, \Honda developed its Civic car by giving a group
of young middle managers broad guidelines (make it youth-friendly and fuel-ecient) and
letting them get on with the job." Also, \Motorola's middle managers have had a say in
designing its Iridium satellite project." (\The salaryman rides again," p. 70, February 4th,
1995.) Obviously, there may be a combination of reasons (e.g. incentives, information,
exibility, work overload) for decentralizing strategic decisions.
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model with quadratic transportation costs, the demand eect (rms want to
be \where the demand is"), outweighs the strategic eect (rms want to be
local monopolists) (see D'Aspremont et al. [3]). Consequently, rms dieren-
tiate their products as much as possible in order to soften price competition.
In my model, an incentive eect also counteracts the strategic eect. If this
eect becomes stronger, managers will delegate more responsibility to their
subordinates, and products will be less dierentiated. In particular, a higher
impact of quality on prots favors more discretion in equilibrium.
Delegation decisions relate to organizational structure and market strat-
egy. Thus, studying the strategic nature of delegation yields several implica-
tions in the eld of management strategy.4 The optimal level of discretion, as
a function of the discretion level in the rival rm, may be increasing (\strate-
gic complements") as well as decreasing (\strategic substitutes"), depending
on the revenue functions. Delegation of responsibility makes a rm \tough"
in the sense that it reduces the prots of the rival rm; more discretion results
in a higher probability of high quality, and a less horizontally dierentiated
product. Moreover, from the viewpoint of an incumbent facing a potential
entrant, an optimal entry accomodation strategy is to give the subordinate
little discretion (in the terminology of the taxonomy of management strate-
gies of Fudenberg and Tirole [6]: adopt a \puppy dog" strategy). The reason
is that delegating less responsibility results in a more dierentiated product,
which softens price competition if entry occurs. By the same intuition, the
optimal entry deterrence strategy is to empower the agent (to become a \top
dog").
An interesting observation is that in the model, an authoritarian leader-
ship style (the subordinate gets little discretion) corresponds to a soft stance
on the product market, and \hands-o" management corresponds to an ag-
gressive market stance. Without claiming generality, this result points out
that leadership styles may be perceived quite dierently inside and outside
a rm.
4Management strategy studies how a manager optimally designs the rm's organization
and market strategy, taking any public constraints into account (see Spulber [11]).
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In typical models of industrial organization, rms are viewed as \black
boxes." Although this approach has led to important insights, it has ma-
jor shortcomings. As Spulber [10] argues: \For economic models to have
practical value to managers, they need to address the choice of both compet-
itive actions and organizational design" (p. 536, emphasis in original). By
combining organization theory and industrial organization, this paper makes
a preliminary attempt at shortening the gap between economic theory and
management strategy.
The main literature on competition and organizational incentives studies
situations in which managers play a market game on behalf of owners (see for
instance Vickers [14], Fershtman and Judd [5], Sklivas [9], and Katz [8]). The
question in that literature is whether contracts between owners and managers
can serve as precommitments. Having an agent play the market game may,
for instance, result in lower quantities or higher prices. The fundamental dif-
ference with that literatures is that I abstract from agency problems between
owners and managers, and instead look at delegation inside rms. Delega-
tion of responsibility serves an organizational purpose { namely, it motivates
a subordinate to take initiative and exert eort (although commitment may
play a role). Also, an important dierence is that in my model, the principals
compete on the market, by selling goods produced by their agents.
In Horn et al. [7], contracts between owners and managers give a manager
incentives to reduce the cost of production. A common feature of their paper
and mine is that organizational design takes place before market decisions
are taken. Their analysis suggests a negative relation between incentives
to reduce costs and the competitiveness of product market interaction. In
my model, which focuses on quite dierent issues, stronger incentives (more
responsibility for a subordinate) result in more severe price competition.
The organizational model is based on De Bijl [4]. In that paper, which
in turn was inspired by Aghion and Tirole [1], I investigate a principal-agent
relationship in which the principal appeals to the agent's private benets from
exerting eort, such as job satisfaction, by giving him a say in the selection
of the project the agent has to implement. Although the principal has the
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formal authority to select a project, it is in his interest to pick one that
generates interest from the agent. Thus, although the superior has formal
authority (the decision right), the subordinate may to some extent have real
authority (see also Tirole [13]).
The model is presented in the next section. The formal results are de-
rived in section 3. Section 4 discusses implications for management strategy.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model consists of three building blocks: a Hotelling-type product mar-
ket, the organization of a rm, and competition between vertical structures.
These will be taken up in turn.
Product Market Competition:
There are two rms, called 1 and 2. Firm 1 can choose a horizontal product
specication (or product location) x1 2 [ 1; 0], and rm 2 a product spec-
ication x2 2 [0; 1].
5 The vertical product quality of rm i is denoted by
ri.
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the interval [ 1; 1]. The will-
ingness to pay of a consumer \located" at z for rm i's product is decreasing
in the distance between z and xi, and increasing in ri. A consumer has an
inelastic demand for one unit; she purchases the good that gives her the
highest net surplus.
Once product characteristics are xed (see below), the rms compete on
the product market by simultaneously setting prices. Marginal costs are
equal and normalized to zero. Before the price competition stage, the rms
observe each others' product characteristics. To keep the analysis tractable,
price competition is not modeled explicitly. I will assume that given product
locations x1 and x2, and qualities r1 and r2, there exists a unique equilibrium
5This assumption rules out coordination problems among rms, in order to focus the
analysis on more crucial issues.
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in the price subgame. Also, qualities are suciently high so that the market
is always covered.
Given the unique equilibrium outcome in the price subgame, rm i's
revenue (or prot) function is denoted by Ri(x1; x2; r1; r2), which is twice
continuously dierentiable in x1 and x2 (i = 1; 2). Also, Ri(x1; x2; r1; r2)  0.
Assumption 1 (Revenue functions)
(i) Ri(x1; x2; r1; r2) is strictly increasing in ri, and strictly decreasing in rj,
for all x1; x2, i = 1; 2.
(ii) Ri(x1; x2; r1; r2) is strictly decreasing in x1, and strictly increasing in x2,
for all r1; r2, i = 1; 2.
The interpretation of assumption 1 is direct. A rm's prot level is in-
creasing in its own vertical product quality, and decreasing in its rival's qual-
ity. Furthermore, given quality levels, the rms would like to dierentiate as
much as possible to soften price competition. So implicitly, on the interval
[ 1;1] the strategic eect (rms want to be local monopolists) dominates the
demand eect (rms want to be \where the demand is").6 Thus, the model
applies to markets in which it is protable for rms to position brands in mar-
ket niches. Moreover, the assumption will allow for easy comparison with the
maximum dierentiation result of the Hotelling model with quadratic trans-
portation costs.
Organization of a Firm:
The way a rm is organized is adapted from De Bijl [4]. Firm i consists of
a principal Pi (the manager) and an agent Ai (the manager's subordinate),
i = 1; 2. The role of a principal in a rm is either to impose a horizontal
product specication or to delegate the product location to his agent. Given
6Cf. the Hotelling location model with quadratic transportation costs, some nite
reservation value for consumers, and possibly dierent vertical product qualities. The
willingness to pay of a consumer located at z for good i in that model is ri pi d(z xi)
2,
where pi is the price of the good, and d a measure of the transportation cost. For r1 = r2,
product locations in equilibrium are x
1
=  1 and x
2
= 1 (see D'Aspremont et al. [3]).
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product location, the subordinate takes care of development and production,
and vertical product quality is determined by his eort level. Once location
and quality are determined, the manager chooses a price in order to maximize
expected prots.
An agent is motivated to exert eort by private benets, which are related
to horizontal product characteristics. Private benets may include job sat-
isfaction, a sense of achievement and accomplishment, perks on the job, the
acquisition of professional experience, career concerns, and so on. For sim-
plicity, the agent does not respond to pecuniary incentives. For instance, the
agent is innitely risk averse with respect to income. Accordingly, each agent
receives a constant salary equal to his reservation wage, which is normalized
to zero.7
A1's private benets are determined by Nature as follows. Exactly one
point in [ 1;0] yields the agent benets b; all the other product locations
yield b < b (where b > 0). The location of the high private-benet point is
uniformly distributed on [ 1; 0].8 The private benets of A2 are determined
in a similar fashion on the interval [0; 1], and are independent of A1's private
benets. Let
  b  b:
If Ai is not allowed to produce the high private-benets good then he will
exert low eort, which results in low vertical quality ri = ` > 0. Conversely,
producing a good which yield high private benets results in high product
quality ri = h > `.
9 Note that by abstracting from pecuniary incentives,
punishments based on low eort are ruled out.
The realization of Ai's private benets can only be observed by Ai, but
7In De Bijl [4] I show that abstracting from payments does not harm generality if an
agent is relatively more responsive to private benets than to money.
8The discontinuity in the distribution simplies the exposition; it is not crucial for the
insights.
9One can explicitly model an agent's behavior. Suppose an agent has a utility function
U (b; e), where b denote private benets and e his eort level. Assume U (b; e) is increasing
in b for all e, strictly concave in e for all b, and satises @2U (b; e)=(@b@e) > 0. It follows
that the agent's optimal eort level e(b) is increasing in b.
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he has to incur a private cost F  0 (for instance, time and eort) to do so.
The principal cannot verify whether his agent gets informed.
P1's delegation decision is expressed by a function p1 : [ 1; 0] ! [0;1],
such that if A1 recommends product location x1, he is allowed to produce the
good located at x1 with probability p1(x1), but has to produce the good at
 1 with probability 1 p1(x1). Similarly, P2's delegation scheme is described
by a function p2 : [0; 1]! [0; 1] (A2 has to produce good 1 with probability
1  p2(x2) given proposal x2). So
pi(xi) = Pr(Ai is allowed to produce good xi j Ai proposed xi):
Whether an agent will learn his private benets depends on the discretion













One can write down a similar inequality for A2. To make the model inter-
esting, the following assumption is made:
Assumption 2 F < , implying that if an agent has complete responsibility
concerning product location (pi(xi) = 1 for all xi) then he will get informed.
An uninformed agent is indierent between the possible locations. For
simplicity, he will then propose the principal's preferred location.
I assume that a principal can commit himself to a delegation scheme; the
focus of the paper is on delegation as a means to motivate a subordinate.11 A
justication is that a manager cares about his reputation to keep a promise.
Since selling a high-quality good located at xi may yield higher prots than
selling a more dierentiated low-quality good for all xi that satisfy pi(xi) > 0,
10To be precise, b and b represent the private benets obtained by the agent given his
optimal eort level; e.g., using notation introduced in footnote 9, b represents U (b; e(b)).
11It will be shown that pi(xi) 2 f0; 1g for all xi, so that there is no need to assume that
principals can commit themselves to carry out randomizations.
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delegation schemes may be optimal ex post; the assumption is not crucial.
This is typically the case if high quality has a relatively large impact on rev-
enues, compared to dierentiation.
Competing Organizational Structures:
The principals compete with each other; they face each other on the prod-
uct market. There is no interaction between the agents, and they cannot
communicate with each other. The course of events is as follows:
t = 0: Nature selects the agents' private benets, unobserved at this stage.
t = 1: The principals simultaneously choose delegation schemes, unobserv-
able outside each rm. Each principal communicates the delegation
scheme to his agent, who then decides whether to learn his private
benets. The latter decision is private information for an agent. The
agents then simultaneously recommend product locations to their prin-
cipals. Product locations are simultaneously selected according to the
delegation schemes. An agent's proposal and the selected location are
unobservable outside each rm at this stage.
t = 2: Each agent picks a production eort level, and vertical product qualities
are realized.
t = 3: Product locations and qualities are observed. The principals simulta-
neously set prices and the goods are sold on the market.
It is important to notice that once production has taken place, delegation
schemes no longer matter; only product locations and qualities inuence the
prices that are charged in the market.
In the analysis that follows, subgame perfect equilibria in pure strate-
gies are derived. Since the price stage is not modeled explicitly, essentially
the principals compete by simultaneously selecting delegation schemes. The
analysis focuses on symmetric equilibria.
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3 Analysis
The rst proposition allows us to represent delegation schemes by well-dened
\discretion levels." In particular, in any equilibrium pi (xi) = 1 for all xi in
some interval containing rm i's maximally dierentiated product location,
and pi (xi) = 0 otherwise.
12 A discretion level for rm i's agent, denoted by
Xi, is accordingly dened as the length of the interval on which pi(xi) = 1.
A higher level of Xi corresponds to more responsibility for agent Ai. In par-
ticular, if Xi = 0 then rm i's manager imposes his agent to produce the
maximally dierentiated product. If Xi = 1, agent Ai has full responsibility.
Proposition 3.1 In any equilibrium, there exist discretion levels Xi 2 [0; 1],
i = 1; 2, such that A1's recommendation x1 is followed up if and only if
x1   1 + X

1





Proof: See the appendix.
Intuitively, given the level of responsibility the rival rm's agent has, each
principal faces the following tradeo. Giving his agent little discretion results
in a lack of initiative: the agent has no incentive to learn his private benets
and make a recommendation. The maximally dierentiated product will be
produced, but quality will be low. Much discretion results in initiative: the
agent will get informed and recommend his preferred product location. The
product will be less dierentiated, but quality will be high if the proposal is
followed up.
Using (1), a direct consequence of proposition 3.1 is that Ai gets informed
if and only if he has enough discretion.




12A similar result is obtained in De Bijl [4], with a discrete number of projects and in
the absence of a rival rm.
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Some additional notation is introduced. Let i : [0; 1] [0; 1]! < denote
Pi's expected revenue as a function of (X1;X2), given that both agents get















Ri( 1; x2; `; h)dx2 + (1 X2)Ri( 1; 1; `; `)

:



























With expected prots written as functions of levels of discretion, we are
ready to derive the main results. The following lemma will be invoked re-
peatedly in the analysis below.
Lemma 3.1 (i) i(X1;X2) is strictly decreasing in Xj, for all Xi, i; j = 1; 2,
i 6= j
(ii) i(X1;X2) is strictly concave in Xi, for all Xj, i 6= j, and
(iii) @1(0;X2)=@X1 > 0, for all X2; and @2(X1;0)=@X2 > 0, for all X1.
Proof: Dierentiate i(X1;X2) partially (twice to prove part (ii)) and apply
assumption 1. 2
If we suppose that agents can costlessly observe their private benets, so
that i(X1;X2) = i(X1;X2), i = 1; 2, then lemma 3.1 has straightforward
interpretations. According to part (i), a principal wants the agent of the rival
rm to have as little discretion as possible. Notice the similarity with the
assumption that a rm wants the rival rm to locate as far away as possible.
The eect of little discretion for the rival rm's agent is, however, twofold:
rst, it softens price competition, and second, it results in a low probability
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that the rival product will be of high quality. Using terminology of Fudenberg
and Tirole [6], delegation of responsibility makes a rm \tough," in the sense
of reducing the rival rm's prots.
A straightforward implication of lemma 3.1 (iii) is the following:
Corollary 3.2 If F = 0 then in any equilibrium each principal gives his
agent some responsibility, i.e., X
1
> 0 and X
2
> 0.
The next proposition gives necessary and sucient conditions for exis-
tence of an equilibrium in which both agents have full discretion. Informally,
proposition 3.2 states that both agents have full discretion in an equilib-
rium when selling a high-quality product is more protable than selling a





. Since the agents have complete freedom to pick product location, both
products will be of high quality.
Proposition 3.2 There exists an equilibrium in which each principal gives












R1( 1; x2; `; h)dx2: (2)
Proof: By lemma 3.1 we have 1(X1;1) is strictly concave in X1, and also
@1(X1; 1)=@X1 jX1=0 > 0. Therefore, X

1
= 1 is a best response to X
2
= 1






equivalent to inequality (2). The result follows by symmetry. 2
Inequality (2) can be interpreted directly in terms of product characteris-
tics: given that the rival rm's agent has full discretion (which implies high
vertical product quality), a principal prefers to sell a high-quality product lo-
cated at the center (that is, at 0) to a low-quality product that is maximally
dierentiated.
Proposition 3.2 demonstrates that in addition to the demand eect, there
is an incentive eect that opposes the strategic eect. A manager may want
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to empower his subordinate to select product location because it will result
in high product quality. Under condition (2), and also under the conditions
for equilibria with intermediate discretion that are given in proposition 3.4
below, the incentive eect is suciently strong so that we do no longer observe
the maximal dierentiation result of the Hotelling model.
By corollary 3.2, an equilibrium in which each principal imposes his agent
to produce the maximally dierentiated product exists only if F > 0.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that F > 0. There exists an equilibrium in which




= 0, if and




R1(x1; 1;h; `)dx1 <
F

R1( 1; 1; `; `): (3)
Proof: Let F > 0. By lemma 3.1, 1(X1; 0) is strictly concave in X1, and
@1(X1; 0)=@X1 jX1=0 > 0. Therefore, X

1
= 0 is a best response to X
2
= 0
if and only if 1(
F

; 0) < 1(0; 0), equivalent to inequality (3). The result
follows by symmetry. 2
A necessary condition for (3) is
R1(0; 1;h; `) < R1( 1; 1; `; `): (4)















R1(x1; 1;h; `)dx1 > R1(0; 1;h; `):
Inequality (4) can be interpreted more directly than condition (3). It
says that a principal prefers to sell a low-quality, maximally dierentiated
product to a high-quality, minimally dierentiated product, given that the
rival rm produces a low-quality product that is maximally dierentiated.
Thus, high quality does not have a large impact on prots, compared to
product dierentiation.
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As proposition 3.3 demonstrates, the model is able to generate the well-
known maximum dierentiation result of the Hotelling model with quadratic
transportation costs. This occurs when the incentive eect is relatively weak,
so that the strategic eect dominates both the demand eect and the incen-
tive eect.
There may also exist equilibria in which agents have an intermediate level
of discretion, enough to motivate them to get informed.
Proposition 3.4 There exists an equilibrium in which each principal gives
























)[R1( 1; 1; `; `) R1( X

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concave in X1, and @1(X1;X

2






best response to X
2











equivalent to the equality in (5). The result follows by symmetry.

































follows by symmetry. 2
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Condition (5) in proposition 3.4 states that X1 is a best response to
X2 = X










, the discontinuity of rm 1's prot function implies that we must






increase rm 1's expected prots. This explains the inequality in (5).
It is straightforward to derive existence conditions for asymmetric equi-
libria, but this involves tedious notation without getting additional insights.
For simplicity, suppose that F = . Then there exists an equilibrium in
which one principal gives his agent responsibility and the other does not,
that is, either X1 = 1 and X

2 = 0 or X

1 = 0 and X

2 = 1, if and only if
1(1; 0)  1(0; 0) and 2(1; 1) < 2(1; 0): (6)
These inequalities are standard Nash equilibrium conditions. The second
condition in (6) can also be written as 1(1; 1) < 1(0; 1). Since 1(1; 1) <
1(1; 0) and 1(0; 1) < 1(0; 0), asymmetric equilibria may indeed exist.
4 Management Strategy
Management strategy studies how a manager optimally chooses organiza-
tional structure and market strategy, given any political and regulatory con-
straints. In this paper, organizational design is determined while taking into
account the outcome of market competition { the manager's decision problem
is solved by a backward induction process (see also Spulber [11]).
In the model, a manager selects a discretion level for his subordinate while
reecting on resulting product locations, qualities, and prices. In particular,
a manager's decision of delegation of responsibility captures his market strat-
egy concerning product characteristics and price, and therefore represents,
in the context of the model, the rm's overall strategy. In this section, I
investigate the strategic nature of delegation of responsibility.
16
Strategic Complements or Substitutes?
From a manager's viewpoint, it is interesting to know how the rival rm will
react if he gives his subordinate more or less discretion. Applying notions
developed by Bulow et al. [2] and Fudenberg and Tirole [6], I will analyze
whether an increase of the level of discretion in a rival rm induces a manager
to delegate more or less responsibility to his subordinate. In the former case,
reaction functions are upward sloping, and discretion levels are said to be
strategic complements. In the latter case, reaction functions are downward
sloping, and discretion levels are strategic substitutes.13
Given a unique equilibrium outcome of the price subgame, we can focus
on competition in delegation schemes, represented by the levels of discretion
X1 and X2. Firm i's best response (or reaction function) to Xj (j 6= i) is
dened as
Xi (Xj)  arg max
Xi2[0;1]
i(X1;X2):
The following example illustrates one of many possible situations.

































See also Tirole [12].
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Example (see gure 1): For an intermediate value of F , suppose that in-
equalities (3) and (5) hold. By propositions 3.3 and 3.4, there are two sym-
metric equilibra, namely (0; 0) and (X;X) for some X 2 [F

; 1). For an
expositional purpose, reaction functions are assumed to be increasing in the
regions where agents acquire information.
Suppose now that F = 0, so that we need not worry about discontinuities
in the reaction functions. Dene for all X1,
1(X1)  R1( 1 +X1; 1;h; `) R1( 1;1; `; `);
and for all X1 and X2,
1(X1;X2)  R1( 1 +X1; 1 X2;h; h) R1( 1; 1 X2; `; h):
The value of 1(X1) is rm 1's gain from selling a high-quality product
located at  1 + X1 compared to selling a maximally dierentiated, low-
quality product, given that rm 2 produces a low-quality product located at
the extreme. The value of 1(X1;X2) represents a similar gain given that
rm 2 sells a high-quality product located at 1 X2.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose F = 0.
(i) If 1(X1) > 1(X1;X2) for all X1;X2, levels of discretion are strategic
complements.
(ii) If 1(X1) < 1(X1;X2) for all X1;X2, levels of discretion are strategic
substitutes.
Proof: By dierentiating the rst-order condition @i(X

i (Xj);Xj)=@Xi = 0
with respect toXj (assuming an interior solution), and applying lemma 3.1 (ii),
it follows that the sign of dXi (Xj)=dXj (determining the slope of reaction
function Xi (Xj)) is equal to the sign of
@21(X1;X2)
@X1@X2
= R1( 1 +X1; 1;h; `) R1( 1 +X1; 1 X2;h; h) +
R1( 1; 1  X2; `; h) R1( 1;1; `; `): (7)
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By rewriting (7) as @21(X1;X2)=(@X1@X2) = 1(X1)  1(X1;X2), the re-
sult follows. 2
The interpretation is direct. Suppose revenues of selling a high-quality
product compared to maximally dierentiating its product (which would im-
ply low quality) are higher if its rival sells a low-quality product located at the
extreme, than if its rival sells a high-quality product (not necessarily located
at the extreme). Then Pj's best response to more discretion for agent Ai is
to give his agent Aj more discretion as well. There is a similar interpretation
of the sucient condition for strategic substitutes.
Top Dog or Puppy Dog?
Suppose that only one rm, say rm 1, is active in the market, and that
rm 2 is a potential entrant. One can distinguish two cases: the incumbent's
manager wants to deter entry, or he wants to accomodate entry (for instance
because entry deterrence is not protable). In each case, the incumbent's
manager has to formulate an appropriate strategy. In case of accomodation
for instance, he will want to choose a strategy that softens post-entry price
competition. In what follows, I assume that rm 2's manager decides on
entry (and if he enters, on how much responsibility he will delegate) after
having observed in which market niche rm 1's product is located, and which
quality rm 1 is selling.
The taxonomy of management strategies proposed by Fudenberg and Ti-
role [6] is used to characterize empowerment as a strategy to accomodate
or deter entry. Consider the level of discretion of an agent as the strategic
\investment" variable. A dierence with Fudenberg and Tirole's set-up is
that in my model, the product characteristics resulting from \investment" is
observable, whereas in their analysis, investment itself can be observed. This
dierence, however, does not matter. The reason is that although delegation
schemes are unobservable, each manager can observe the other's product
location and quality before competing on the product market. What is es-
sential is that once production has taken place, delegation schemes no longer
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matter; only the product characteristics are then relevant.
In the product market subgame, prices are strategic complements for
given product characteristics.14 Moreover, by lemma 3.1 (i), delegation of
responsibility makes a rm tough in the sense of reducing the rival rm's
prots.
Suppose that, for a xed level of discretion for A2, the principal of rm 1
delegates more responsibility to A1. The total eect, which is P1's incentive
to delegate responsibility, is given by @1(X1;X2)=@X1. This eect can be
decomposed into two eects. First, a direct (or prot maximizing) eect
of giving A1 more responsibility is that for given prices, rm 1's expected
market share and product quality, and therefore prots, increase. Second,
there is a strategic eect, resulting from rm 2's price reaction. If A1 gets
more discretion, the probability that rm 1's product will be located closer
to the center increases. Therefore, in expectations the products will be less
dierentiated, so that price competition becomes more intense. In particular,
it will be expected rm 2 will react by lowering its price, thereby decreasing
rm 1's market share and prots.
Given that rm 1 wants to accomodate entry, the fact that delegation
makes a rm tough implies that P1 should \underinvest" in delegation.
15 In
the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole, P1 should adopt a \puppy dog
ploy," that is, it should be nice and small in order to avoid to trigger an
aggressive response from rm 2. The optimal entry deterrence strategy for
rm 1 is to \overinvest" in delegation, that is, adopt a \top dog" strategy in
order to be a tough rival. Such a strategy will reduce prots of an entrant.
Dierent Perceptions of a Management Style
The previous discussion points at an interesting link between a manager's
stance inside a rm and his posture on the product market. In particular, in
14
See Tirole [12], chapter 7, for a discussion.
15
More precisely, X1 will be lower than the open-loop solution, which is dened as the
optimal value of X1 if P2 cannot observe the product characteristics of rm 1's product
before setting a price.
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the model there are dierent perceptions of a single leadership style.
Being nice to the rival rm corresponds to adopting a tougher posture
vis-a-vis his subordinate, because there is underinvestment in delegation of
responsibility. More general, the model demonstrates that motivating the
subordinate to take initiative by delegating responsibility corresponds to a
more aggressive stance on the product market. Accordingly, a product man-
ager may give his subordinates a lot of freedom (\hands-o" management);
not because he is such a nice and friendly person, but because he is a tough
competitor. Vice versa, an authoritarian manager (i.e., a manager who gives
his subordinate little or no discretion) is a soft rival in the product market.
Summarizing: a tougher posture of a manager inside a rm (i.e., with re-
gard to his subordinate) corresponds to a softer posture on the product market
(i.e., with regard to the rival rm), and vice versa.
Without claiming generality of this dichotomy, the result tells us that it
is important to recognize the strategic consequences of dierent leadership
styles. Moreover, statements like \Mr. X is a tough manager" may have
little meaning if one does not specify with regard to whom.
5 Conclusion
A manager of a rm in a competitive environment has to take decisions
concerning organizational design and competitive actions. In this paper, a
model is developed that integrates both management aspects.
In the model there is a tension between positioning a brand in a market
niche and producing a premium brand. A product manager can motivate his
subordinate (which is important for quality) by giving him a say in which
variety he has to develop and produce. Giving the subordinate enough free-
dom to select product location motivates him to get informed and make a
proposal. In turn, following up the agent's recommendation induces him to
exert high eort, because the agent will work harder on developing and pro-
ducing goods that yield him higher personal gains. Since high eort results
in high product quality, a product manager may nd it benecial to give
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his agent a say in product location (the incentive eect). In the model, the
presence of incentive eects may result in less product dierentiation than
in the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs.
A more general point of this paper is that when incentive eects exist,
they may be important. When managers take organizational incentives into
account, product dierentiation, and therefore also competition, may be af-
fected. In dierent models, these type of eects may inuence competition
in various ways. Further work in this direction is needed to enhance our un-
derstanding of the inuence of incentives inside organizations on competitive
behavior.
In reality, there may be a combination of reasons of why top managers
delegate responsibility to middle managers { not only incentive issues, but
for instance also work overload, exibility (versus commitment) to adapt to
changing market characteristics, or the collection of information about the
market. The investigation of the strategic nature of those and other issues
related to organizational structure seems to be a fruitful and important area
for further research in industrial organization and management strategy.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
First, the following claim will be proved:





1 if j xi j  j yi j;
0 otherwise,
for i = 1; 2, x1 2 [ 1; 0], and x2 2 [0; 1].
Proof of Claim 1: Let delegation schemes pi (), i = 1; 2, be given.
(i) Suppose that A2 is uninformed, so that P2 will select product location 1.
If P1's best response is to impose product location  1, then the proposi-
tion trivially holds. Therefore, suppose that P1 optimally selects p1() such
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that (1) holds. Accordingly, A1 will get informed. Since R1(x1; 1;h; `) is
decreasing in x1, there exists a ~y 2 ( 1;0] such that
R1(x1; 1;h; `) R1( 1; 1; `; `)  0 , x1  ~y:
















(x1)R1(x1; 1;h; `) + (1  p

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(x1)[R1(x1; 1;h; `) R1( 1; 1; `; `)]dx1 +R1( 1; 1; `; `) 








R1(x1; 1;h; `)dx1   ~yR1( 1; 1; `; `):





1 if x1  y1;
0 otherwise.

















then, by monotonicity of R1, P1 can increase his expected prots by selecting




1 if x1  y1;
0 otherwise.
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(x1)[R1(x1; 1;h; `) R1( 1; 1; `; `)]dx1 +R1( 1; 1; `; `) 
(by monotonicity of R1)Z
~y
 1





(x1)[R1(x1;1;h; `) R1( 1; 1; `; `)]dx1 +R1( 1; 1; `; `) 
(by monotonicity of R1)Z y1
 1
[R1(x1; 1;h; `) R1( 1;1; `; `)]dx1 + R1( 1; 1; `; `) =
Z y1
 1
R1(x1; 1;h; `)dx1   y1R1( 1; 1; `; `);










1 if x1  y1;
0 otherwise.
(ii) The proof of the case in which A2 learns his private benets is similar to
case (i), and is omitted. 2
Claim 1 allows us to dene the level of discretion of agent A1 as the
measure of interval [ 1; y1], that is, X1  y1 + 1, and similarly, A2's level of
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